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Anonymization is viewed as a solution to over-exposure of personal information in a data-driven society. Yet
how organizations apply anonymization techniques to data remains under-explored. We investigate how such
measures are applied in organizations through a small-scale interview study, asking whether anonymization
practices are used, what approaches are considered practical and adequate, and how decisions are made to
protect the privacy of data subjects while preserving analytical value. Our findings suggest that applying
anonymization is a complex socio-technical process and it is less common than we had originally expected.
Organizations that employ anonymization often view their practices as sensitive and resort to anonymity by
obscurity alongside technical means. Rather than being a purely technical question of applying the right algo-
rithms, anonymization in practice relies on multi-stakeholder collaborations across organizational boundaries.
Here we observe engagement of what Suchman has called “multiple, located, partial perspectives” in ongoing
discussions necessary to negotiate the technical as well as organizational complexities of implementing data
anonymization.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In 2016 Apple announced that they would use differential privacy, an advanced data anonymization
approach, to protect the privacy of their users while analyzing their behavior. Reactions to this
announcement were overwhelmingly positive [20]. However, Apple only granted a brief glimpse
of their methods to an independent researcher, and no information was published about the details
of their implementation. Barely a year later Tang et al. [49] published results from a painstaking
study of the actual implementation of differential privacy in the MacOS Sierra operating system,
arguing that Apple’s approach may not be as effective as was originally suggested and urging
Apple to make the details of their implementations across the various operating systems, devices
and services transparent. Tang et al. [49] argued that Apple used noise parameters that were too
large for the differential privacy implementation, rendering the process ineffective because the
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probability of de-anonymization becomes unacceptably high. The subsequent debate acknowledged
the complexity of the approach and many argued that transparency about implementation is
required for anonymization to be trustworthy and effective.
Data anonymization algorithms have been a staple of data management and statistical research
for decades [29]. As data production, collection and use expanded in scale, data anonymization
approaches and policies became increasingly utilized for addressing the emergent privacy risks [38].
Yet applying anonymization is far from trivial [17] and when organizations promise to anonymize
the data they use, how can societies be sure that such promises are in fact fulfilled without insight
into its usage in practice [21]? Implementation of anonymization algorithms requires making subtle
assumptions on what constitutes sensitive information, along with enumerating and estimating
the risks of possible information disclosure [29, 42, 43]. The usage of contemporary anonymization
algorithms such as k-anonymity [47] and differential privacy [15] involves the calibration of
stochastic methods to balance between reducing the risks and preserving the analytical value
of the published data. Intricate heuristics have to be followed to map complex requirements of
human data subjects to relevant parameters of the anonymization algorithms [4]. These factors
all contribute to the considerable difficulty in making decisions when anonymizing datasets. As
the Apple example above demonstrates, the definitions and policies are still being formulated
and the public has limited knowledge about the practices and motivations involved in making
decisions about anonymization. In this paper we investigate whether and how anonymization
algorithms are implemented by organizations and companies in Europe. Our goal was to explore
how anonymization approaches are used, whether they are considered practical and adequate, and
how decisions are made to protect the privacy of data subjects while preserving analytical value.
We found that despite growing interest from a broad range of stakeholders and high expec-
tations of the merits of data anonymization methods, few of the organizations we approached
applied them in practice. This may be a symptom of anonymization being an afterthought, but
the attitude is changing given the way the new European General Data Protection Regulation
(EU GDPR) explicitly excludes data that are anonymized from its purview [41]. Our study and
response rate were complicated by the fact that many of the organizations we contacted, consider
the topic so sensitive that they are unwilling to discuss their handling of it. Some claim that such a
policy of non-disclosure is in place to ensure that anonymization procedures are less vulnerable to
de-anonymization attacks. This resembles a kind of anonymity through obscurity approach as an
extra safeguard, although security experts recognize that relying on obscurity is ineffective. Swire
[48] names more than a hundred thousand discussions of practitioners online, noting that most
criticize security through obscurity. Among the six organizations that discussed their anonymiza-
tion approaches with us, we found that decision-making varied considerably across practitioners
working in different fields. Approaches to ensuring the viability of data anonymization for balancing
privacy and analytical value often included the development of complex socio-technical systems
of additional safeguards together with relatively nonchalant acknowledgements of the remote
possibility of de-anonymization attacks. Achieving anonymization for these organizations was far
more than implementing the right algorithm and our participants acknowledged that there was
nothing definitive about their methods. Rather, these were contingent, dynamic processes that
required managing different types of domain knowledge and disparate levels of technical expertise,
transforming anonymization from a purely technical activity to a socio-material practice [45].
2 BACKGROUND
Data anonymization is not a new concern. Anonymization, de-identification, pseudonymization,
and data masking all refer to methods of removing information that can be used to identify
individuals. Conventional anonymization methods, such as k-anonymity, usually combine some
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suppression, generalization, and perturbation based on hypotheses of what background knowledge
a hypothetical adversary might possess, to reduce the risk of indirect identification. Although many
researchers use the terms anonymization and de-identification interchangeably [7, 33], some have
argued that the term de-identification more clearly captures what these approaches do and do not
offer [42]. From a mathematical perspective perfect anonymization is not possible and available
algorithms are only providing pseudo-anonymization. However, we use the term anonymization
following the European General Data Protection Regulation (EU GDPR) that defines anonymization
and distinguishes it from pseudonymization, which is relevant for data management approaches in
Europe in particular [25, 41]. The regulation gives the term anonymization special meaning with
significant legal implications.
2.1 Anonymization in the EU GDPR
In the European context, anonymization has recently gained new prominence due to the EU GDPR.
According to the 2015 Eurobarometer report on data protection, 57% of EU citizens believe that
regulation regarding the sharing of private data requires additional attention, and 70% are concerned
that corporations and institutions use their data for other aims than the original purpose of data
collection. Only about 15% feel that they have complete oversight over the usage of sensitive
information provided through online channels [18]. Privacy concerns then become an issue for
hopes of a lucrative data-driven economy. Yet research has shown that people may be willing to
disclose more data if they believe their data will be anonymized [6]. GDPR addresses many of these
concerns, and establishes anonymization as a possible solution to processing personal data. The
regulation draws an important distinction between anonymizing such data and pseudonymizing it.
GDPR exempts anonymous data from its purview, defining anonymization as “data rendered
anonymous in such a way that the data subject is not or no longer identifiable” [41] and requiring
that de-anonymization is provably not possible even with additional information. The regulation
also imposes further burdens on the data controller to “ascertain whether means are reasonably
likely to be used to identify the natural person, account should be taken of all objective factors,
such as the costs of and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration
the available technology at the time of the processing and technological developments” [41].
In comparison, Article 4 of the GDPR defines pseudonymization merely as: “the processing of
personal data in such a way that the data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject
without the use of additional information” [41, 53]. This approach aims to reduce the risk of re-
identification (whichmay be possible with additional information), but has no legal effect [41].While
the GDPR introduces some clarity in terms of identifiability and consequences, the requirements
for anonymization and for what qualifies as “reasonably likely” are less clear [25, 38].
2.2 Understanding Anonymization in Practice
Anonymity has been an important area of research in many areas of computing, including CSCW,
although the vast majority of this effort has been from the point of view of the end-users. Studies
have shown that users may seek anonymity for a variety of reasons, but they are often unsuccessful.
This is due to the lack of technical expertise [24], lack of awareness about the full extent of (meta)data
collected [10, 32], underestimation of the data retention policies and inference capabilities of parties
with access to data [19, 23], the perceived difficulty of using anonymization applications [3, 10, 23],
the lack of support by some platforms and services for anonymous use [19], as well as governmental
efforts to block access when using anonymization applications [44, 54]. When it comes to online
security and privacy, non-experts tend to rely on oversimplified mental models to assess risks and
make decisions, leaving them vulnerable to threats they do not account for [24, 40, 52]. Correa et
al. have shown that posts on an anonymous social media site cover a rich spectrum of content
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types and anonymity sensitivity, and noted that the level of anonymity required may differ [11].
Leavitt [27] demonstrated that the use of anonymous accounts to manage sensitive discussions
and evade privacy issues was common, but the pervading reason for their popularity was their
convenience. Fulfilling user anonymization needs is not trivial. For example, informed users can
make decisions about their data that are mostly consistent with their values, but enabling their
involvement using appropriate interfaces and services may be complicated [6]. It is no secret
that anonymization applications have a usability problem. For example, the design of Tor and its
mobile browser hardly facilitates feedback, user motivation, or learning of correct threat models,
increasing risks [3]. Yet anonymization is not exclusively the responsibility of the user. In a data-
driven economy, it is important to turn our attention to those that collect and use data rather than
focusing on the practices of those that produce it.
Comparatively little research has investigated how anonymization is applied within organizations
and what challenges they might face. Sedayao et al. reported unforeseen risks when directly imple-
menting a limited anonymization framework in an enterprise, intended for protecting employee
data [43]. However, they only note limitations of the particular approach they used, k-anonymity,
and do not discuss broader organizational implementation issues. Adams & Blandford studied
how security policies and procedures in a clinical setting are perceived by employees within an
organization, showing that implementations of security and patient data management policies
can become divisive when they are defined top-down by the IT department [2]. Elliot et al. [17]
developed the notion of the data situation to discuss the context-dependent nature of anonymization
as a process. They acknowledge that the technical application of algorithms is only a small part of
the overall process of complex decision making, which also includes ethical considerations, public
engagement and stakeholder analysis. On the basis of extensive research, Elliot et al. [17] propose
a practical decision-making framework for applying anonymization given the requirements of the
current and upcoming European legislation. However, aside from relatively general instructions for
how organizations might implement anonymization, there is little discussion of what organizations
already do and why. As CSCW research has repeatedly demonstrated, understanding current
approaches and practices is important for further research and tool development.
2.3 Major Approaches to Anonymization
The area where anonymization was investigated first is statistical data analysis. Statistical Disclosure
Limitation (SDL), also known as Statistical Disclosure Control, focuses on protecting the privacy of
subjects in statistical data sets for research purposes. SDL is often applied to tabular data intended
for public release, and is associated with a broad range of techniques including de-identification—
exhibiting some overlap with anonymization, as well as aggregation, sampling, and query-based
access methods, among others. The goal of SDL is often framed as finding an optimal balance in
a given case with regard to trade-offs between information content and confidentiality. In their
review of SDL methods, Matthews and Harel [29] note that multiple alternative conceptualizations
of privacy and disclosure can impact risk assessment and selection of anonymization techniques.
Moreover, despite the variety of SDL techniques it is difficult to ascertain what is “private enough”
given the constant need to strike a balance between privacy and utility. Research on SDL is mature
and some scholars have argued that SDL offers a framework to augment newer and more complex
algorithms of today [22, 42]. However, SDL is highly structured and prescriptive. It clearly defines
which data must be treated and how, making it more difficult to apply in the diverse context of big
data. This has led the computing community to focus on probabilistic and combinatorial methods
that are often advocated as generic and domain-independent.
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Syntactic Anonymization Approaches. Concerns about data exposure have grown in lock step with
advances in data collection and processing capabilities. Early on, Sweeney demonstrated that re-
identification of subjects in U.S. Census data is not only possible, but relatively easy by linking these
datasets with other publicly available data [46]. Sweeney challenged widespread assumptions that
removing explicit identifiers from person-specific datasets would ensure the subjects’ anonymity
and developed one of the most popular formal models of anonymity: k-anonymity [47]. A tabular
dataset is said to be k-anonymous if each valuation of a subset of columns (a quasi-identifier) occurs
at least in k different rows in the table. A quasi-identifier [12] can be used to identify individuals
using correlation. This anonymization method requires that data holders pinpoint quasi-identifiers
with due diligence but acknowledges that there are limits to inferring what might constitute these.
Thus even if relatively simple, it is already challenging to apply in practice.
The k-Anonymity protection model and related methods, all known as syntactic anonymity
criteria, have received much criticism about their value for protecting privacy in the last two decades
[14]. Those who challenge the model’s suitability for contemporary applications have highlighted
vulnerabilities stemming from unique characteristics in the data, questions about the viability
of defining quasi-identifiers, as well as the outright failure of the model on high-dimensional
datasets, among other factors [9]. However, k-anonymity has been and continues to be influential.
Syntactic anonymization techniques, including k-anonymity, are often listed in guidebooks and
legal documents on the topic, usually along with their weaknesses (e.g. [38]).
Differential Privacy. As criticisms of syntactic approaches mounted, alternative notions of privacy
gained notice. In a series of theoretical results Dwork demonstrated that de-identified data do not
really exist, either because subjects are still identifiable, or the data carry no information. Dwork
introduced the notion of differential privacy, a data protection model that allows to control the
trade-off between anonymity and usability of the data more explicitly [15]. A key principle of
differential privacy is that anonymity loss should be quantified in a meaningful way. The privacy
“price”, or ϵ (epsilon), is used to calibrate the amount of randomness introduced into query results;
achieved by adding random noise to the answers. Yet setting the value of ϵ can be problematic, as
the Apple case has demonstrated. Computing a global sensitivity and selecting the ϵ value that
both guarantees privacy and provides usable data is a difficult task that requires a complex analysis
of the domain [9, 37].
Differential privacy also has other limitations: it does not offer protection to known cohesive
groups or entire populations from conclusions based on aggregate results, and according to the
Fundamental Law of Information Recovery, overly accurate answers to too many questions will
eventually destroy anonymity (similar to other privacy-preserving analytical techniques) [15].
Moreover, differentially private algorithms or database mechanisms have to be developed for every
use case separately, which has been a barrier to adoption, and its operating principles may be
difficult to grasp without mathematical/statistical knowledge. Thus differential privacy is not an
obvious and final answer to anonymization problems in industrial practice [9]. In light of these
issues it is rather unclear how many data controllers would be willing to undertake the effort of
adoption of differential privacy.
2.4 The Problem of Re-identification
In the early 2000s advances in anonymization inspired a lot of confidence and companies began
releasing their datasets publicly. In 2006, Netflix released an anonymized sample consisting of the
movie ratings of 500000 subscribers as part of the Netflix Prize; a public competition intended to
improve their recommendation system. Narayanan and Shmatikov demonstrated severe limitations
of the applied anonymization [35]. They introduced robust, general methods for identifying users
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in supposedly anonymized datasets, and used this case to reflect on the challenges of anonymizing
sparse datasets.
Rapid advances in re-identification techniques lead to laments about the “broken promises” [36]
of anonymization as a technical solution to data privacy woes. The efficacy of anonymization
as a solution to the problems of a data-driven society has been hotly debated since. The policy
community has made efforts to rehabilitate the promise of anonymization as an approach to
privacy-preserving data processing. Notably, Cavoukian et al. argued that anonymization should
be encouraged, as they estimated re-identification risks based on proofs of concept in the literature
to be low, and stricter regulatory measures would hinder potentially beneficial secondary uses of
data [7]. In response, Narayanan et al. critiqued Cavoukian et al.’s approach as un-scientific, pointing
to arbitrary assumptions about the knowledge of attackers, and disregard for significant privacy
risks stemming from inference methods [33]. Narayanan et al. further argued that anonymization
should not be seen as a default option by policymakers due to it providing no robustly quantifiable
privacy [34]. Beyond the differing conceptualizations of data anonymization, there are ongoing
debates about its merits for solving privacy issues associated with analyzing personal data. While
researchers like Nathan Eagle see anonymization as key to enabling fair use of personal data [16],
others have already proclaimed its failure in specific domains [13]. To reform policies, Rubinstein
and Hartzog advocate more organizational responsibility and combined technical and regulatory
measures tailored to minimize risks in a given context [22, 42]. However, despite recognition that
purely technical approaches to anonymization have limited utility, it is curious that there has
been little discussion of organizational processes and socio-technical approaches so far. To explore
this question we leverage Suchman’s concept of located accountabilities as a way to consider
how application of anonymization processes is managed within organizations given their obvious
socio-technical nature [45].
3 METHOD
Our goal in this study was to learn how anonymization techniques are applied in practice, which
techniques are typically selected and used as well as what kinds of policies guide decisions about
anonymization. Where theoretically the legal context and internal organizational policies ought
to work as guidelines for applying anonymization, in practice what such anonymization actually
constitutes and how decisions about which data to anonymize likely vary dramatically. As we began
our study we expected that different types of organizations may be more or less willing to discuss
their anonymization practices. As such we identified and approached a wide range of organizations
in Denmark, all of which act as data controllers because they collect some form of personal data
for business purposes. We were willing to remain flexible and to adjust our engagement with each
organization depending on their requirements. However, we were unprepared for the difficulty
of finding entities that utilized anonymization at all. Even among the many (public and private)
organizations whose primary activities involve processing and sharing sensitive personal data,
very few admitted to the use of any anonymization methods.
As this became apparent, we adapted our data collection approach to contact entities further
across Europe, focusing on organizations that publicly communicate their processing of personal
data on a large scale and those that operate in sectors with especially strict regulation, whose
practices would be most impacted by the GDPR. Thus, we systematically contacted census- and
national statistical agencies, healthcare organizations, financial institutions providing personal
finance services, telecommunication providers, major online advertising-, search-, and social net-
work platform companies, data analysis- and data science companies working with consumer-
or political research, IT companies that participated in large European public IT projects, highly
digitized multi-national enterprises with a large number of employees in Europe, and other Internet
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organizations and IT consultancy-, IT infrastructure-, and IT service providers (with particular focus
on those emphasizing anonymization, privacy, or related terms in their public communication), as
well as researchers at universities who have engaged with these sectors in their work.
3.1 Data collection
Data collection was conducted in the winter and spring of 2017 using snowball-sampling techniques.
We collated a list of likely organizations to contact using the industry contacts available via our uni-
versity and authors personal networks. We also searched for profiles on professional and academic
portals (i.e. LinkedIn and Academia) for individuals and organizations that mentioned expertise
in anonymization, collated job postings mentioning anonymization and collected media news
items. The first author contacted directly close to 70 persons and organizations via email, briefly
introducing the project and, when possible, attaching the set of interview questions we prepared
in advance, in order to ensure the transparency of the study (see Appendix A). In our contact
emails we explained that we are academics interested in understanding how data anonymization
techniques are applied in practice and which techniques organizations find most useful. In order
to best accommodate participants’ individual preferences we offered to conduct the interview by
email, in person, by phone or Skype. Even if they declined to participate for whatever reason, we
asked everyone we contacted to recommend other relevant people or organizations for our study.
Two organizations (one private, one public) that are involved almost exclusively in personal
data processing pointed us to their publicly available policies or guidelines. Our analysis of these
documents showed that while quite different in form, they addressed matters of privacy relevant
to the organizations’ business practices. These documents typically mentioned confidentiality
and identifiability, but they did not mention anonymization at all. These public-facing documents
presented a set of policies each organization used for their data management but did not provide
insight into how these policies were implemented. Formal documents may clearly prescribe action,
but CSCW research has repeatedly demonstrated that employees engage in a range of coordination
activities to make these prescribed actions a reality if these are in fact followed at all [5, 30]. Seven
of those contacted declined to help without explanation.
In total, we received 12 responses with content. Six of the respondents only provided either
incomplete answers to our initial questions (and were not willing to be interviewed more exten-
sively), or provided answers about data handling practices that did not involve anonymization. For
completness we detail these below. Two responses shared organizational policies or guidelines; one
data scientist at a multi-national advertising and search company indicated that he could not answer
our questions for security reasons, despite working on relevant research projects (implementing
differential privacy), and having contributed to multiple academic papers on the subject; an IT
manager at a multi-national pharmaceutical company provided general internal notes and slides
about anonymization, pseudonymization, and other concepts relevant to decision making about the
use of personal data in light of GDPR; an employee services lead at a multi-national IT company
provided some answers about an internal HR feedback system designed to collect data anony-
mously; and an HR manager at a multi-national consumer research firm provided information,
internal guidelines, and a contract template for collecting personal data confidentially. Another six
respondents provided complete responses as well as answered follow up questions or agreed to
direct interviews, each from a different field (see Table 1). Two interviewees requested that answers
be handled confidentially and one other required that we sign a non-disclosure agreement prior
to participation (no answers from this participant are presented unless these answers were also
echoed by other respondents, however we used this data to inform our thinking). To respect all
requests for confidentiality we provide little specific information on the interviewees beyond their
position and the field in which they are engaged.
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3.2 Sample description
Six complete interviews informed our analysis most (Table 1), although we relied on all data
we gathered. These covered a broad range of sectors and anonymization approaches. For each
organization we interviewed one representative. To aid in readability we use one-letter pseudonyms
to refer to each participant. B from HEALTH and F from TELECOM were researchers that also
engaged with data management and policy in various organizations alongside their academic
pursuits and had the most theoretical expertise and practical experience with anonymization
approaches. B (HEALTH) also served as the data protection officer (DPO) for a clinical center. The
rest of the participants were an analyst (A from FINANCE), a software developer (G from SOFT)
and two IT specialists (C from ENERGY and D from LEGAL) who were also involved to a different
extent with organizational policy about anonymization and data handling.
Below are short descriptions of the relevant aspects of each organization:
A (FINANCE): Typically shared data with specific contracted third parties and the size of the
datasets their organization anonymized varied depending on the situation. They employed goal-
specific anonymization techniques in order to comply with legal and regulatory requirements.
B (HEALTH): Shared data with specific contracted third parties and dataset size varied depending
on the situation. They employed different anonymization techniques based on the characteristics
of the dataset, to comply with legal and regulatory requirements, and expressed additional ethical
concerns as reasons for anonymizing.
C (ENERGY): Typically worked with very large datasets that required distributed infrastruc-
tures, and shared data with specific contracted third parties. They were looking to anonymization
techniques to comply with legal and regulatory requirements, and also saw anonymization as an
additional competitive advantage, although this level of implementation was still in the planning
stages.
D (LEGAL): Worked with medium and even small-scale datasets. They were the only organization
that explicitly prepared data for public release. They employed an anonymization system com-
bining named entity recognition and human review in order to comply with legal and regulatory
requirements.
Table 1. Interviewee description
In text Sector Interviewee
position
Anonymization
approach
Additional
security
efforts
Data
sharing
Country Interview
via
A
FINANCE
Finance Analyst Goal-specific Legal,
IT security
Limited Denmark Email
B
HEALTH
Healthcare DPO Dataset-specific Limited
access
Limited Hungary Email
C
ENERGY
Energy Startup CEO Planned Legal Limited France Skype
D
LEGAL
Legal/public
data
IT Developer NER+human-in-
the-loop
IT security Public Denmark In person +
email
G
SOFT
Software
development
Software
developer
Masking Internal
access only
Internal Denmark Email
F
TELECOM
Telecom Researcher Privacy-through-
security
Auditing
queries
None,
query
results
only
UK Skype
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G (SOFT): Worked with medium and even small-scale datasets. They had to anonymize externally
received data for internal use. They employed masking techniques to comply with legal and
regulatory requirements.
F (TELECOM): Were typically working with very large datasets that required distributed in-
frastructures. They developed an audited query-based system to provide answers instead of data
to contracted third parties. They employed this approach to comply with legal and regulatory
requirements, but expressed additional ethical concerns as reasons for anonymizing.
3.3 Data analysis
All interviews were collated and those that were conducted as conversations were recorded and
transcribed. Data analysis followed an iterative approach with each round of coding focusing
the investigation. The first author conducted an in-depth coding of all interview data following
techniques derived from a grounded theory approach [8]. After the first round of coding, initial
themes and insights were discussed with the second author and another round of thematic coding
was conducted. The themes that coalesced after the second round of coding were discussed by all
authors, finalizing analysis and relevant insights.
4 FINDINGS
Data anonymization is an actively discussed subject: it is granted a prominent role in current and
upcoming legal policies about personal data, researchers from multiple disciplines contribute new
methods or challenge assumptions on a regular basis, and companies like Apple even advertise their
approach as a competitive advantage. However, despite an intensive, extended period of searching
for potential interview subjects who engage with anonymization, very few of the organizations we
had contacted indicated that they applied anonymization techniques of any kind to the data they
used. Although many noted that they vaguely planned to implement anonymization of some sort
at some point in the future, the most common reason for declining participation in our study was
that the companies we contacted did not perform anonymization on the personally identifiable
information they might be collecting and using. The practitioners that we did interview can be
loosely describe according to their approach to anonymization although some used more than one
of these approaches: (a) some use pseudonymization or anonymization/de-identification in a limited
manner, (b) some use or have used a syntactic anonymization method similar to k-anonymity, and
(c) some are using or developing advanced methods such as for example those based on differential
privacy.
The general agreement among respondents was that the number of individuals and organizations
using anonymization approaches declines sharply when moving from limited to more advanced
methods not only because of technical complexity but also because of the difficulty with balanc-
ing privacy and data utility. Among the interviewees the majority were only using one form of
anonymization—although all were aware of limitations in their different approaches and some
took additional steps to protect data. In what follows we discuss why and how decisions about
anonymization were made and what drove application of different kinds of approaches. We then
describe our participants’ concerns about the limits of anonymization and the additional measures
they at times utilized to mitigate these limitations. Finally, we discuss the apparent problem of
organizational secrecy around anonymization practices and the implications of the reticence to
disclose these practices for the protective promise of anonymization as a privacy safeguard.
4.1 Why is Anonymization applied?
Despite the limited number of responses in our sample, the reasons for anonymization, decisions for
which anonymizationmechanisms to employ and how to apply these varied covering a full spectrum
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of practices. For example, A from FINANCE and B from HEALTH operated in highly regulated
environments, thus compliance was one of their primary drivers. Personal data regulations in
many countries in Europe are quite heavy duty and the GDPR will generate even more regulatory
pressure for implementing anonymization in the commercial context.
Yet regulation was not the sole driver. B, the data protection officer (DPO) from HEALTH, was
very much concerned about ethics: “I publish my work in scientific papers, give lectures in medical
informatics conferences and inform colleagues at my workplace. I want to represent the interests
of the research subjects (patients) and protect their privacy rights.” Here practical organizational
concerns directly intersected with academic research and ethical discussions that, when coming
from an institutionalized position of the DPO, could create an organizational space for ethical
debate. B (HEALTH) pointed out that they also relied on an explicit “code of conduct on how to
obtain research data,” which guided how decisions regarding anonymization needed to be made.
C, whose ENERGY startupwas just in the process of planning for anonymization implementations,
expressed their concerns primarily with an eye to business development: “I see anonymization as an
enabler, in the sense that the good anonymization techniques would help us develop our business
and more innovative services.” In this case, the use of anonymization was seen as an ethical and
potentially significantly advantageous business practice: “I think like everybody’s talking about
these big data services market, which is supposed to be huge, but we can assume that big part
of this big data market depends on good anonymization, which means that billions of dollars,
huge opportunity.” The implications of the GDPR at the European level clear drive anticipation of
business opportunities alongside technical concerns for the efficacy of anonymization techniques.
D explained that LEGALwere focused on public court order data and saw the need for anonymiza-
tion as a process that would automate an existing manual practice and as a way to demonstrate
that anonymization processes can be done more efficiently thus motivating broader application
to generate public data. As D (LEGAL) explained: “while this [was the] first Danish system . . .
anonymization process . . . it was risky business. But we could prove that if it would be successful, it
would be a big gain.” The researcher F from TELECOM noted that telecom companies are very much
aware of the sensitive nature of the location data they possess despite this area being currently
not very strictly regulated. The sensitivity of such data has been previously debated with some
researchers arguing that despite telecom data being potentially very useful for public good purposes,
such data are so difficult to anonymize that making them too freely available is risky [50].
Alongside these high level concerns of ethics, business or regulation, our participants also shared
much more practical reasons for using anonymization in organizational contexts. For example, A
from FINANCE and B from HEALTH anonymized data in order to enable data sharing with external
parties such as supporting research projects or engaging with business partners. B (HEALTH) also
made their decisions directly in response to research data requests: “In the case of small data sets,
simple de-identification method is used. When larger data set is processed, then I investigate the
anonymisation issue in detail, taking into account scientific literature, the project needs and the IT
capabilities.” Thus anonymization was often applied in response to particular data needs rather
than as a matter of course.
4.2 How is Anonymization applied?
When exploring decisions for how to anonymize data, we observed a diversity of approaches.
Some, such as G (SOFT) or D (LEGAL), described previously established frameworks that were
consistently applied to all data they were anonymizing. In contrast, A (FINANCE), B (HEALTH)
and C (ENERGY) explained that they developed, or expected to develop, anonymization procedures
tailored to each specific dataset. The approach of F (TELECOM) was the most extensive, proposing
alternative methods involving radical limitations and oversight on data use.
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Working With Established Frameworks. D from LEGAL and G from SOFT explained that their
organizations had developed established frameworks over time. In both cases the process involved a
significant engagement with the relevant stakeholders identifying what types of information were
considered sensitive, developing proposals and sketching out solutions collaboratively. Eventually,
these processes were codified in frameworks that combine IT systems and structured organizational
activities of human involvement in the process.
D (LEGAL) was part of the team that developed a system where requirements were established
through a lengthy, multilateral discussion involving two collaborating IT companies, the Courts of
Denmark, and language technology researchers: “there was a careful discussion between the courts
and the specific company about the set of rules that they should follow, the anonymizations, what
could be accepted, what shouldn’t be accepted.” The courts made requirements about what should
be considered sensitive information and how it should be handled, as well as came up with multiple
possible solution scenarios. The IT companies, in collaboration with the researchers, focused on
providing input about what they considered technically feasible. The software they eventually
developed takes unstructured court documents as input (with no markup, and sometimes also
formatting and spelling issues), performs named entity recognition (NER) [31] trained for this
legal text domain to select anonymization candidates, and outputs structured XML files that can
be further processed automatically in the document pipeline. The obtained system implements a
mixed technical and manual solution in the style of SDL.
In light of the strict requirements about sensitive information and the limitations of language
technology at the time of development (the project started in 2006), it was clear that human
oversight in the anonymization process was crucial. This meant that the NER was optimized for
recall, selecting every possible anonymization candidate to save reading time for the human editors:
“given that those people . . . had to go through every document, then made sense to give them a little
more control, instead of making the automatic anonymization focus on very high precision. . . . I
decided on focusing on recall, because that would help the manual process a lot.” The candidates are
ranked by confidence of recognition with pseudonymous labels based on semantic categories (as
specified by the Courts of Denmark, e.g. persons, companies, etc., with entities numbered according
to order of occurrence in the document). The trained human editors then evaluate and finalize
the anonymized output. A drawback of this approach is that different names are occasionally not
recognized as referring to the same entity and mislabeled, which the editors have to recognize
and correct. The system is currently in use and applied to court documentation. Substantial data
homogeneity made it feasible to develop such a structured single-approach system because it is
applied to a very predictably organized dataset. The manual approach was also necessary because
certain data were simply too difficult to manage automatically: “there were things like ethnicity—
should that be anonymized? . . . we might have been able to find trigger words, but the problem,
the markup of candidates for anonymization would have been very fuzzy.” The company instead
built a complex socio-technical process that resulted in anonymized datasets where the human
editors continuously engaged in coordination and repair work.
G from SOFT described a different highly collaborative process that demonstrated reliance on
networks of working relations across organizational and disciplinary boundaries. This software
development and consulting firm uses data from municipalities for production and testing of public
IT systems. As they G described their process: “[. . . ] the initial approach was based on customer
requirements, and a desire to reach as high a masking level as possible. We now have a company-
wide framework for data masking, used to ensure the ability to do cross-solution/platform testing.”
Although we were not able to get a specific technical description of their anonymization method,
the technique appears to be derived from relatively lightweight syntactic approaches. Selection
of fields that should be masked is conducted collaboratively with the business unit, using their
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knowledge of the data to evaluate what can be used to identify individuals (directly or by inference),
and decide what constitutes sensitive information. The security unit, with assistance from legal
and the project team are also involved in decision-making regarding the masking setup, which is
reflected in the company’s policies. Despite potentially quite heterogeneous data, G explained that
SOFT were able to develop a company-wide framework because their use of the data is very specific
and pre-defined. In this case, converting the data to the right format is relatively straightforward
and the question that needs to be considered is which fields to designate as sensitive: “Within
the organisation we have multiple stakeholders: security, legal, business units, who all have to
be on board for the project to succeed. Security and legal need to know what we do, so policies
reflect our setup. Business units have knowledge of the data we are tasked with masking, so we
need them for analysis prior to masking their data to ensure we don’t miss anything.” There is
then a codified highly collaborative process for identifying sensitive data in any dataset, done with
acknowledgement of what Suchman called located accountabilities [45] where responsibilities are
discussed, shared, assigned and worked through.
These examples demonstrate that anonymization as an approach is not a single algorithm but
a socio-technical framework that includes algorithmic processing together with collaborative
human oversight working across multiple boundaries, thus acknowledging how partial and located
knowledge about what constitutes sensitive data can be. However, these two approaches are
very different in how the social and the technical are combined into a coherent process. Where
LEGAL has implemented a kind of “human-in-the-loop” system with human coders filling in for
the inadequacies of technology, SOFT’s framework was there to explicitly support discussion of
options and possibilities as part of decision-making. In an interesting iteration on this idea, F from
TELECOM argued for a much more constrained and technically bounded solution where to keep
the promise of anonymity while extracting value from such data, an alternative method is necessary
involving “privacy-through-security.” The dataset would be on a secure server with an audited
question-and-answer system. Queries would have to be submitted for (human or algorithmic)
review first, and when approved, the user would only receive the result, without direct access to
the data. All user activity would be recorded and monitored, with the possibility of automatically
restricting access: “basically, how can we ensure that the data will be used anonymously, not
because the data is anonymous, but because everything has been put in place to ensure that the
data will be used anonymously.” In this way, the organization of F (TELECOM) can be in control
as they remain legally responsible. This vision also included an acknowledgement for the need to
have a social component to compliment the technical systems: “we want to make sure that we have
people locally that can help us decide what are questions that are ok to be looking at, not ok to be
looking at, so we’re putting in place what we call a local governance board.” In this conception
local advisors are expected to be involved in the decision making about the design and pre-set
limits of such a system [28, 39].
This is reminiscent of Dwork’s work where the effort is really on controlling what kinds of
queries can be allowed on any dataset [15], but also clearly recognizes the material and located
nature of anonymization and goes beyond what Kunda has termed “corporate attempts at normative
control” [26]. Discussing how to gracefully implement the social and the technical components
however, lead to an admission that both aspects of the system are visions in search of implementation.
How these might need to be implemented to ensure that the local engagement and the technical
components might be gracefully integrated together remains an open question, leading us back to
old questions of how networks of relations might be managed to build located accountabilities [45].
The fact that complex socio-technical solutions are at least considered, and often actually used, in
these technologically advanced data-centric organizations challenges the very idea of convenience
and effectiveness of generic anonymization solutions.
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Tailored Anonymization Procedures. The practice of tailoring anonymization procedures to each
data request is a different approach and is likely more common in organizations that engage with
many different third parties. For A (FINANCE) and B (HEALTH) the data were typically generated
as part of the services their organizations offered to customers. These data then were utilized
for purposes other than the direct provision of service, requiring special handling. C explained
that ENERGY currently store data and do processing for data holders and have conducted pilot
projects with researchers based on data from their customers: “I think the first objective here is
to make sure that you give an adequate protection to people, so you need to identify what does
it mean—adequate protection—and on the second hand you need to make sure that you provide
enough useful information to the service.” As this ENERGY startup explores anonymization, C
emphasizes that there can be significant differences between services in terms of what is considered
useful information, and thus each case requires discussion of what (if any) anonymization approach
should be taken.
The conditions that defined whether and how anonymization was applied differed depending
on the context of data sharing for C (ENERGY) and A (FINANCE) and, especially in the case of
B (HEALTH), on the size of the dataset. For B (HEALTH) where smaller datasets allowed for
simple de-identification methods primarily because they did not include enough information
for de-anonymization in cross-referencing scenarios, larger and more diverse datasets required
significant oversight. As the DPO explained: “When a larger dataset is processed, then I investigate
the anonymization issue in detail, taking into account scientific literature, the project needs and the
IT capabilities.” The issue of size for B (HEALTH) brought up a lot of interesting concerns. Some
of these larger, more complex projects required development of a selection and anonymization
algorithm, which asks crucial questions about funding and responsibilities, demanding involvement
of different parties for decision-making. For example this could include people from the local
operation team, or the IT company contracted for data processing.
The way that specific features of the dataset should be handled, in terms of suppression or
generalization, were evaluated on a case-by-case basis (for A (FINANCE) and B (HEALTH)) with
actions taken based on the value of the data and how challenging it is to anonymize them. As B
(HEALTH) explained: “Generally the demographic data (birth date, birth place, resident address,
ZIP code), numeric identifiers (social security, patient identifier in the HIS system) are removed
or de-identified.” Given the specificity of health data, in these cases physiological parameters are
rarely perturbed, but in the case of longitudinal data, dates are distorted to prevent known-date
attacks. In some cases, B (HEALTH) chose to perform de-anonymization attacks and to compute
probabilities to express risks, in order to review the results before finalizing the approach.
In all cases the ideal approach was typically negotiated by multiple stakeholders, but in some
cases (A (FINANCE), C (ENERGY)) experience with relevant anonymization methods or lack thereof
could prevent the necessary agreement on the route of action. For B (HEALTH) the medical research
ethics committee and the information security leader also needed to be consulted about key aspects
of the anonymization approach, and the final decision was made by the president of the clinical
center on the basis of collaborative input. Yet even when discussions were not quite so formalized
(A (FINANCE), C (ENERGY)), they spanned many departments (i.e. legal, customer service, IT
support) and were crucial to understanding and managing the risks and responsibilities involved
in releasing any dataset. For example, C (ENERGY) explained: “The choice of techniques will
be done between product marketing people, and the development people. And then the other
important player would be the client, the customer, then there is the public body in charge of
privacy protection—like, in France we have CNIL.”1 It is clear from our data that the organizational
1CNIL is Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Libertés, the French national data protection authority.
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complexity of decision making about the choice of technique or framework for anonymization
can vary significantly depending on types of data, organizational configurations as well as how
responsibilities are assigned and managed. What at the first glance appears to be a technical decision
turns out to be a complex balancing of socio-technical processes where partial knowledges [45]
must be managed as anonymization relies on imagining future attackers or future problems. After
all, predictions of futures are always partial.
4.3 Beyond anonymization
Anonymization is not an easy solution and our data provide no indication that anonymized datasets
were ever treated as unproblematic. The problematic nature of anonymization was discussed in two
ways. On the one hand, anonymization procedures could limit the utility of the data and required
changes in how data might need to be treated. On the other hand, the threat of re-identification
was always present and acknowledged. F (TELECOM) argued that while data anonymization/de-
identification methods like k-anonymity might have historically been adequate, they do not scale
to address the challenges associated with contemporary data capture and analytical practices, and
fail outright when it comes to location and mobility data: “The thing is, historically, it worked ok
. . . one of the first, k-anonymity algorithm . . . worked well when we were sending data in paper
form, on floppy disks, and fairly small datasets, like Excel file type data, CSV data. The big issue is,
in today’s world the data that people are actually interested in are fairly big, over time, very big
dimensional data of human behavior . . . the technique of anonymizing such data just does not scale
. . . it worked well in Excel with five columns, it does not scale to data in which you have hundreds
of thousands of points about a single person over a period of a year.” The argument here is that
such an approach does not prevent re-identification in the face of current threats but the promise
of anonymization could lead to legal decisions being based on the fact that the data have been
anonymized. Such concerns illustrated the problem for many in our project—the privacy threats
addressed by anonymity had to be serious enough to warrant potential reductions in the utility of
the resulting dataset, yet it was clear that understanding and estimating real or imagined risk was
very difficult: “It helps, and yes of course, doing something like it makes it more difficult, but . . .
the current state of technology is such that anonymization does not prevent re-identification.”
For C (ENERGY) and A (FINANCE), the fact that anonymized data cannot be linked with other
data sources such as social media and public registers could become a major issue. The suppression
and generalization techniques applied on their datasets could further limit data utility in some
cases. B (HEALTH) and A (FINANCE) noted that anonymization methods sometimes had to be
changed in cases where algorithms resulted in data that did not produce valuable results. As
B (HEALTH) explained: “Since large data sets are requested by participants of bigger scientific
projects, therefore sometimes the implementation needs to be changed. When the expected results
are not obtained, or the algorithms do not produce any valuable results, then the anonymization or
the record selection process has to be changed.” C (ENERGY) noted that developments regarding
anonymization in the smart energy field are primarily enabled and driven by agencies and other
governmental organizations. They are tasked with finding a balance between protecting the privacy
of citizens and sustaining innovation for economic growth—a trade-off where the right position is
rarely evident.
Given the public nature of their data output, D explained that LEGAL paid a lot of attention to
ensuring the security of the system and the overall document pipeline, such as during file transfers,
and in terms of access. D (LEGAL) pointed out that “[. . . ] even if all references to people, companies
etc. are anonymized perfectly, then there is a risk that, I expect, will grow in importance: By
automatic cross-referencing various data sources it is likely that anonymized documents can be
enriched with the previously removed references to people, etc. Currently, it is difficult to construct
Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, Vol. 2, No. CSCW, Article 66. Publication date: November 2018.
Going Beyond Obscurity 66:15
countermeasures for that sort of reverse anonymization. I’m convinced that the world is undergoing
a learning process now, which might bring solutions.” Despite the involvement of human editors,
predicting what could be done with proliferating datasets of different kinds becomes a guessing
game where, echoing F from TELECOM, anonymization “does something” but in and of itself it is
not enough.
G explained that SOFT were very much aware that their masking approach does not really make
data anonymous, and is susceptible to re-identification by an attacker with the right knowledge.
However, G noted: “our take is that any data that is truly anonymous is not usable for testing
(functional testing and above)” as it eliminates essential structural information, so no one could
rightfully claim to use it. When it comes to the drawbacks of masking, the testing process has to be
adjusted, and testers (i.e. customers) need to get used to working on masked data. G noted that SOFT
managed the risk of re-identification by limiting the extent of masked data use to internal operations
only, as well as limiting discussions of their approaches outside the small teams that engaged in
data masking. Anonymization was only part of a range of restrictive practices that all organizations
tried to employ. For SOFT, however, this sort of secrecy became integral to achieving the balance
between utility and privacy protection. Considering legislative changes like the GDPR, G (SOFT)
argued that data masking is the one possible way of compliance. However, SOFT continuously
reevaluated their approach to optimize their setup and to address new threats from more open
datasets and new re-identification schemes. They have also considered working with synthetic
data, but concluded that it is infeasible due to the complexity of the degrees of freedom involved
in generating it. Instead they try to make re-identification as hard as possible while retaining the
necessary utility, only use the data in-house, on specific test setups, and rely on obscurity as an
additional security measure.
F (TELECOM) noted that his research team proposed a radical solution, which was essential
because adding noise to location data yields decreasing returns in terms of privacy with respect to
mobility traces. The team demonstrated that, due to individuals’ highly unique spatio-temporal
traces in “[...] credit card and mobile phone and other location data types, four points, four places
and times where someone was, is sufficient to uniquely re-identify him 95% of the time.” This led
the team to develop highly restrictive approaches, by limiting access to data and creating a system
of monitoring and oversight for data queries from external parties.
In all cases we heard different discussions of how access to anonymized data could be and often
was managed and restricted. For C (ENERGY) and A (FINANCE), any external parties receiving
access to anonymized data must be subject to some form of contractual agreement. In some cases
secure storage devices are used when transferring the data, as an additional security measure to
prevent unauthorized access. B (HEALTH) noted that out of consideration for any unanticipated
risks, only the members of the research project that requested the data may have access to it.
Such extensive efforts speak in part to the limits of anonymization approaches, but in part also to
the difficulty with trusting any anonymization approach in the face of continuous technological
development. As F (TELECOM) explained: “Anonymization is such a convenient idea, it is so easy,
it’s beautiful, like oh you take the data and then someone smart comes and invents an algorithm
that’s . . . the data and you can do anything you want with it . . . but then it turns out the dataset is
subject to you know short term or medium term re-identification.” Despite the efforts, there was a
sense of risk and impermanence to anonymization techniques and so the representatives of the
organizations and companies we spoke to repeatedly came back to the socio-technical puzzle they
were solving and the impossibility of a purely technical solution.
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5 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
Although anonymization has been featured in public discourse, emphasized in private data regula-
tions, and emerged as an active object of academic inquiry in multiple disciplines, of the nearly 70
organizations we approached far fewer indicated that they use these approaches than we had
expected. At the same time, many organizations that did engage with anonymization treated it as a
sensitive topic and thus refused to answer our questions or limited the information they provided
due to security concerns. Approaches to anonymization among our respondents and their reasons
for granting access were diverse. They expressed significantly different opinions, echoing some of
the ongoing debates about the viability of data anonymization. Perspectives ranged from general
optimism about the possibilities of emergent anonymization methods to complete dismissal of
conventional anonymization practices and the policies that regulate them.
At the same time, even among participants that did agree to engage with our study, their
willingness to disclose details of organizational anonymization approaches varied. Among thosewho
offered complete answers, some asked for confidentiality, with their answers handled anonymously.
In these cases, their disclosure of information went through a legal and security approval process.
Curiously, the stated reasons for reticence in this kind of disclosure were explained less by concerns
about loss of competitive advantage and more by additional security measures to limit the potential
for de-identification attacks. This sort of anonymization-by-obscurity is potentially problematic
and warrants deeper consideration. While some responses cited security reasons for not providing
more information, reasons for treating the subject as sensitive are not easy to pinpoint. Such
attitude can also be motivated by the data anonymization methods being seen as trade secrets,
which could be the case for example where industrial research is being done, or alternatively by
concerns about gaps between actual practices and legal or internal policies, potentially resulting in
a lack of control over the data, which could negatively affect their reputation if published. To us
this suggests a significant immaturity of practice and the variability of policies around application
of anonymization mechanisms and disclosure of these policies troubles the expectation of trust
increasingly required for the data economy to operate.
5.1 The Problem of Anonymity-by-obscurity
Concerns about de-identification threats in many cases lead to efforts to control threats through
additional measures such as contractual agreements about data use or limited data releases (only
to project members, etc.). One of the major ways of limiting exposure, however, was through
efforts of obscurity. In many cases companies claimed that they were unable to explain their
approaches to us precisely because this was their way of limiting the possibility of external attack
on their anonymized datasets. We see this as a significant problem, and a limitation to its uptake.
Obscurity, understood as secrecy regarding privacy protection practices, is likely the first reflex
for many organizations, and may be interpreted as a sign of immaturity of industrial practice
in this respect. Security practice has shown extensively that obscurity protects secrets only as
long as an exploit has not been found. Returning to the Apple example, while the company has
lauded its own efforts at applying differential privacy, highlighting the complexity of this technique
as particularly important, the refusal to disclose how exactly the algorithms were being applied
motivated researchers to investigate and led to a public relations problem.
From the point of view of privacy protection, the practice of anonymity-through obscurity has
an additional drawback: it could be seen as an unwillingness to engage with the data subjects, and
the broader society in a dialog about what should be protected and why. After all, being secretive
about your practices makes it impossible to openly discuss them. Anonymity is often touted as a
solution when data usage is discussed with respect to public concerns. The idea that when datasets
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are anonymized privacy risks are sufficiently minimized to assuage most worries underlies new
laws and policy implementations. Surprisingly, little research has examined how users react to their
data being anonymized by others, although Brush et al. [6] suggest that users may be more willing
to share location data publicly if they believe it to be anonymized. This suggests that if consumers
come to believe their data are anonymized in a way that does not expose them, they may be willing
to share more data - which can be problematic if what "anonymization" means is unclear. A deeper
understanding of the socio-technical processes that produce anonymized data in practice are crucial
for ensuring that when an organization promises anonymization, it is a trustworthy promise.
5.2 Located accountabilities of anonymization
The heterogeneity and complexity of data anonymization approaches is rarely made explicit in
research, policies, or public discourse. Our data begin to surface contrasts in decision-making
between various fields of application but also the very similar struggles they encounter. While
the interviewees working with court orders and software testing used a predetermined and well
defined anonymization approach or framework, the other responses highlighted more complex
decision making. For G (SOFT) and D (LEGAL), the technical approaches were invariable and the
necessary human decision-making needed to be done either before (G (SOFT)) or after (D (LEGAL))
the application of their particular anonymization method. In contrast, for the rest of the participants,
the selection of the anonymization method itself had to be adapted or developed every time for each
particular case or dataset, requiring complex negotiation throughout the process. Yet even with
pre-set frameworks, their development in the first place required a complex socio-technical process
involving networks of relations within organizations working across domain boundaries [45].
In Suchman’s terms, while these organizations appear to be struggling to present a decontex-
tualized front of technological superiority that solves the apparent problems of privacy through
sophisticated highly complex technical solutions, the reality is kept tenuously together through
significant efforts of working across boundaries and acknowledging that knowledges are always
partial [45]. Each interviewee had their own perspective on the benefits and risks of the data
anonymization practices in their own cases. Through their responses, they have also outlined—
directly or implicitly—their views about the viability of data anonymization as a solution to protect
privacy while preserving analytical value. These opinions show interesting contrasts, and may help
understand the debates surrounding anonymization.
Where D (LEGAL) was optimistic about future developments in anonymization solving privacy
issues, D was critical about the protection their project provides against newly emergent re-
identification threats. For C (ENERGY), anonymization is seen as an enabler of more innovative and
competitive products, although finding the right approach for particular applications is expected
to be challenging. G explained that SOFT struggle to balance data viability with anonymization,
claiming that truly anonymous data would be of no value at all. While B (HEALTH), C (ENERGY)
and F (TELECOM) brought up protecting privacy as a key objective, others seemed to focus more
on compliance with legal or internal policies. The concerns expressed in our data suggest that
despite the care and effort involved, even the most complex anonymization approaches seem to
offer too limited protections and may lead to a false sense of security, not addressing acknowledged
and emergent threats. Anonymization then seems to be a little bit of an organizational “hot potato”
where even discussing it can be seen as a dangerous form of disclosure that could lead to technical
or public relations attacks. At times, it seemed that anonymization was seen as a necessary evil to
be navigated in order to be able to cope with problems stemming from privacy regulations but in
all cases it required immense internal organizational effort.
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5.3 Socio-technical Anonymization as Method
How are decisions about anonymization made? In the organizations that we engaged there seems
to be at least a general agreement and some guidelines that define whether and how anonymiza-
tion is applied. In some cases, all datasets of a certain type and used for a particular purpose are
anonymized using an established and painstakingly maintained framework. In other cases, there are
particular conditions that may lead to different levels of effort in anonymization. However, across
all of our respondents we observed an emphasis on a collaborative process comprised of diverse
stakeholders that was necessary in order to identify how anonymization might be applied. The
multi-stakeholder decision process addressed issues that ranged from setting goals and identifying
risks, to decisions about which specific data ought to be masked. In most cases, what kinds of
queries were allowed on even anonymized datasets is also tightly controlled unless the datasets
(as in the legal case) are released publicly.
Part of the reason for this extended system where the application of algorithms is only one aspect,
is because in all of the organizations having a clear idea of who is responsible for data handling and
for responding “should something go wrong” is crucial in order to accomplish the use of data at all.
Yet these responsibilities play a role in anonymization decisions to a different extent depending on
the data and the purpose. After all, different types of data demand different levels of concern and
effort. This depends on legislation and policy (financial and medical data are extremely regulated)
or technical challenges of anonymization (location data) or both (energy data are increasingly
regulated and potentially difficult to anonymize). Elliot et al. point to the idea of a “data situation”,
advocating the importance of considering the relationship between data and environment in
anonymization decisions [17]. However, their report is oriented explicitly towards the organizational
unit implementing the technical components and, although they emphasize the importance of
considering legal and ethical obligations, they note that “consulting with your stakeholders is a
useful exercise” [17, p. 101]. Our data suggest that in fact consulting with stakeholders is central to
doing anonymization and not merely an exercise.
The socio-technical entanglement that enables anonymization in practice goes against much
of the discussion and rhetoric around anonymization. Some discussions such as the public debate
between Cavoukian and Narayanan suggest that the technical, social, and legal approaches to data
disclosure are often in opposition. The legal approaches may over-optimistically rely on algorithmic
guarantees, while the technical approaches are far more pessimistic, as they develop increasingly
complex techniques that are potentially difficult to implement in practice [1, 9, 15, 34]. More social
approaches, many of which are thoroughly researched and discussed in CSCW, seek to enhance
awareness of problems, to produce analysis of potential impacts and, most importantly, to nudge
and influence “folk theories” [40, 51] or “naïve” [24] behavior towards particular visions of generic
“good security practices.” The formulation around anonymization in GDPR suggests that the legal
community has come to believe that technical implementations can offer the benefits of data without
the attendant privacy issues and has moved to develop policies and guidelines based on this [4].
Such policies are intended to motivate the “right” kinds of behavior on the part of data controllers
and end users alike. Yet in practice we found that organizations develop processes that merge all of
these aspects pragmatically, demonstrating that instead of opposition, the different facets must work
together to produce usable approaches to data and anonymization. The solution then is to create
diverse teams despite the difficulty of cross-domain collaboration, enabling the engineers, legal and
customer experts to develop anonymization approaches together. It appears that anonymization is
not about getting the IT department or data science wizards to throw some algorithms and make the
problems go away and never will be. Instead, we see a need to support negotiation, “mutual learning
and partial translations” [45] as a matter of course. The more complex the anonymization problem
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the more involved the process and it requires moving beyond claims to universality, demanding
instead practical wisdom in the production of anonymization as a material practice.
6 LIMITATIONS AND FUTUREWORK
Although our research has produced insights into how anonymization is done in some organizations,
our findings have been limited due to the problems of access. We believe that research on how
anonymization is done in practice across different sectors is necessary. In order to understand
what are the potential security issues and implications, we need a way to document particulars
of decision-making processes in more detail. Observing anonymization as it is carried out would
provide an opportunity for an inquiry into the differences between policies and practice as well
as an understanding of how accountabilities are located. While addressing the perspectives of
stakeholders who engage with anonymization in different ways, such as policy makers, managers,
and data subjects, we also may want to ask whether there is a rift between practitioners’ and the
wider public’s understanding.
The lack of published information about organizational data anonymization practices raises
several questions, one of the most pressing being whether the promise of anonymization is indeed
broken [36]. The GDPR will likely drive further efforts towards implementing anonymization by
organizations that are as yet not using such tools. Thus it is imperative to analyze best practices,
addressing the diversity of needs and complications across the different aspects of the data rich
world. Anonymity through obscurity is not going to help this process. Where legislation such as
GDPR emphasizes technical solutions, demanding that anonmyzation techniques withstand the
test of time, our study demonstrates that the technical problems are only one part of the process.
Arguably, the interdependent socio-technical process of anonymization required that organizations
are able to support productive internal crossing of boundaries. Clearly we need transparency and
dialogue about what anonymity actually means in practice. Yet our study suggests that transparency
of the mechanics of technical approaches will not be enough. Rather, we need to seek transparency
for how decisions are made in the course of developing and applying anonymization alogrithms.
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A INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
(1) What kind of data do you capture/data sources do you work with?
(2) At which stages of your work process does anonymization play a role?
(3) How do you decide what anonymization approach to use?
(4) What decisions are made when implementing a specific method?
(5) Why and when may the approach or its implementation change?
(6) How do you determine which features of the data should be anonymized?
(7) How do you decide and control who can access the dataset/queries?
(8) Who is involved in making these choices?
(9) Do you measure/monitor the effects of anonymization on the data itself or your work?
(10) Do you share the (anonymized) data, your analytical capabilities, or the results of your
analysis with anyone outside your organization?
(11) Do you experience any drawbacks of not being able to identify individuals in the data?
(12) Do you discuss your approach to anonymization with anyone within the organization?
Outside the organization? Why? For what purpose?
(13) How confident are you that this approach to anonymization will stand up to potential
de-anonymization attacks?
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